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Abstract 
Labor market regulation varies significantly, both within and between developed democracies. 
While there has been extensive research and debate in economics on the consequences of labor 
market regulation, the political causes for levels and changes in labor market regulation have 
received less scholarly attention. This article investigates a political economy explanation for 
differences in labor market regulation building on a theoretical argument that labor regulation 
can be used as a non-fiscal redistribution tool. Consequently, partisanship, the demand for 
redistribution and government budget constraint jointly determine whether labor market 
regulation will increase or decrease. Consistent with this argument, panel analyses from 33 
OECD countries reveal that labor market regulation increases under left-wing governments that 
face increased market inequality and high government debt. 
 
Keywords 
Labor market regulation, government ideology, inequality, redistribution, government debt  
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
Introduction 
In 2015, the U.S. Democratic Party decided to make a campaign for a significant increase in the 
federal minimum wage part of their national party platform. Previously, president Barack Obama 
had issued an executive order in 2014 to raise the minimum wage for federal government 
contractors and repeatedly called for a general minimum wage increase. By the end of 2015, 
raising the minimum wage had become one of the top issues for the American center-left. Ten 
years earlier, the German social-democratic government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had 
implemented labor market reforms known as the Hartz reforms, some of which enabled workers 
to hold jobs at wages below the standards of previous collective agreements, which are normally 
a pillar of the German coordinated labor market (Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006: 98). While one 
left-of-center government party decided to make increases in minimum wage stringency a top 
priority, the other engaged in an effective partial deregulation of the national wage floor. The 
positions of left-wing parties also change within countries over time, however, as became 
evident in Germany where, several years after having implemented the Hartz reforms, the 
German Social Democratic Party also made the introduction of a national minimum wage its top 
political priority, which became implemented when it joined a government coalition after the 
2013 election (Meyer 2016, 30–31). This article theoretically and empirically investigates the 
reasons why we see such divergent patterns in the role of left-wing parties regarding labor 
market regulation, even within countries. 
 
Labor market regulation, defined here as the formal, non-fiscal regulation of national labor 
markets, including hiring and firing regulations, the nature and stringency of minimum wage 
regulation, the formal support for collective bargaining systems and related policies, is both a 
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timely and hotly debated topic both in both academic and policy circles. An oft-made argument 
is that high levels of labor market regulation have adverse effects on employment (Botero et al. 
2004; Feldmann 2009) and economic growth (Djankov et al. 2006)1 and could increase informal 
sector size (Schneider 2010). Differences in labor regulation have been singled out as a key 
explanation for the very different economic and employment experiences of the US and 
continental Europe in recent decades, where there has been extensive scholarly and policy debate 
in this area (Nickell and Layard 1999; Siebert 1997), a discussion and research agenda which is 
continuing (Dew-Becker and Gordon 2008). 
 
Several OECD countries have enacted labor market reforms in recent decades. After the financial 
crisis and subsequent European debt crises, labor market reforms have been singled out as one of 
the pillars of structural reforms, especially in Southern Europe. However, significant differences 
still exist between advanced economies with regards to labor market regulation and reform 
tendencies. Some countries have experienced a shift toward more deregulated labor markets, 
others display general inertia regarding labor market regulation, while others yet experience 
tandems in labor market deregulation, with deregulation followed by increased labor market 
regulation. 
 
This article concerns the effects of partisanship on labor market regulation. It argues that some of 
the variation and patterns of change in labor regulation among and between developed 
democracies can be explained by the different stances of incumbent left-wing governments. In 
line with recent scholarship on partisanship and differences in public policies (Häusermann et al. 
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2013), the argument is that the policy stance of left-wing governments is contingent on 
moderating factors. In this case, the actions of left-wing governments regarding labor market 
regulation are a function of government budgetary constraints, in form of high government debt, 
and market income distribution. 
 
The line of arguments is that labor market regulation can serve redistributive functions. 
Governments can hold partisan preferences, and a left-wing government is interested in serving 
the interests of below-average-income citizens. Increased market inequality reduces the relative 
market income of below-average citizens while increasing the demands for redistribution from 
these citizens to which left-wing government parties should be responsive. However, if the 
government is under high levels of perceived budgetary constraint as in the case of high 
government debt, increased fiscal redistribution is both financially and politically less viable for 
an incumbent left-wing government. Under such circumstances, redistribution through increased 
labor market regulation becomes an attractive option. Consequently, when an incumbent left-
wing government is faced with an increase in market inequality but also faces high levels of 
government debt, the left-wing government will increase labor regulation. 
 
The empirical part of this article investigates this theoretical argument using panel analyses of 
general labor market regulation in 33 OECD countries. The findings strongly support the 
theoretical argument. Increased market inequality causes left-wing governments to increase labor 
market regulation, but only when government debt levels are high. 
6 
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section establishes the theoretical 
argument for the joint effect of government partisanship, inequality and government debt on 
labor market regulation. The data and estimation method used to test the theoretical prediction is 
then described. The following section describes the results from the test of the theoretical 
prediction. The final section discusses the results. 
 
Theory 
The basic theoretical argument for why we should experience different approaches to labor 
market regulation under left-wing governments contingent on inequality and government debt 
levels is that higher market inequality, which widens the gap between the citizens with the 
average income and those with below average income, increases the relative value of 
government spending for below-average-income citizens in line with classical models of 
redistributive politics (Meltzer and Richard 1981). In accordance with a partisan preferences’ 
approach to politics, left-wing governments should be relatively more responsive to the 
preferences of the below-average-income citizen than non-left-wing governments. Consequently, 
it will adjust its policy profile in the area of public spending to changes in inequality, while a 
non-left-wing government will not. The notion that left-wing and non-left-wing parties react 
differently to increased inequality is in line with previous empirical findings (Pontusson and 
Rueda 2010; Tavits and Potter 2015) and general assumptions in the partisan politics literature 
(Hibbs 1977; Iversen and Soskice 2006). 
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A left-wing government facing higher market inequality should then attempt to increase fiscal 
transfers to the below-average-income citizens. High government debt levels, however, constrain 
the ability of the government to redistribute more fiscal transfers to below-average-income 
citizens due to the need to meet interest payment obligations and the need to appear fiscally 
responsible, which it is assumed is also a concern of any incumbent government, including left-
wing governments.2 This need to appear fiscally responsible also inhibits the use of increased tax 
revenue to finance increased public transfers, as increased tax revenue is more likely to go 
towards bringing down government debt in line with findings suggesting that left-wing 
governments do indeed use increased tax revenue to balance the public budget during times of 
fiscal consolidation (Tavares 2004). 
 
Instead, labor market regulation can be used as a distributive tool instead of explicit transfer 
payments. Labor regulation can reduce the effect of inequality on below-average-income citizen 
market income, since labor regulation can secure a higher income share from average 
productivity for the below average income citizens through employment protection, minimum 
wage laws, capping how many hours can be legally worked a week and other types of labor 
regulation. Note that labor regulation will not necessarily benefit the very poor in many cases, 
including those permanently and temporarily outside the labor market. However, the key 
assumption here is that a left-wing government is attentive towards the welfare of the below-
average-income citizens, which is not necessarily the very poor but in many cases citizens with 
about the median income. Consequently, the left-wing government’s choice between 
representing the interests of labor market outsiders and labor market insiders (Lindvall and 
Rueda 2014) is not an issue for this theoretical argument. 
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Increased labor market regulation has the adverse effect of reducing average income, as labor 
regulation lowers average productivity potential in line with some empirical findings (Besley and 
Burgess 2004, 93–94), which is why it will be less preferred as a tool to redistribute to the 
below-average-income citizens than pure fiscal transfers. This issue becomes less of a concern 
for a left-wing government under high levels of market inequality, however, as greater inequality 
will mean that productivity gains are disproportionally captured by the citizens with the highest 
incomes. Under high levels of inequality, a left-wing government should then be more willing to 
sacrifice average economic efficiency to achieve higher welfare for the below-average-income 
citizens, which will not be the case if income inequality is low and the productivity loss by 
higher regulation is therefore also felt by the below-average-income citizens. 
 
Summing up, the above line of arguments implies that when a left-wing government faces high 
debt levels and increased levels of market inequality, it will increase – or at least not decrease – 
labor market regulation due to redistributive concerns for the below-average-income citizen. 
 
This article is not the first to theorize and test the political determinants of labor market 
regulation. Several pieces of research in political science and political economy have attempted 
to assess the causes of the differences in the labor market regulation of advanced economics.3 
Recent scholarship includes Becher (2010), Potrafke (2010) and Avdagic (2013). However, 
much of the literature on the determinants of labor market policies is concerned with welfare 
state aspects of the labor market (e.g. unemployment benefits) rather than pure labor market 
regulation. Another strain of this literature is concerned with how and whether labor market 
reforms differently affect labor market insiders who hold steady, often well-protected jobs versus 
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labor market outsiders who are more loosely connected to the formal labor market, and why 
countries differ in their adoption of reforms related to this area (Davidson and Emmenegger 
2013). Since both labor market insiders and outsiders are potentially important left-wing party 
constituencies, the role of left-wing parties has been an important part of this research agenda.4 
However, none of the studies above takes the issue of government fiscal constraint into closer 
consideration, when assessing whether and how left-wing parties influence labor market 
regulation.  
 
The article’s theoretical argument also bears some resemblance to part of the political economy 
literature, which also investigates the tradeoff between labor market regulation and explicit 
public transfers as tools of social protection (Boeri et al. 2012; Di Giacchino and Sabani 2009; 
Di Giacchino et al. 2014). However, these authors do not provide a more systematic test of the 
implications of their theoretical argument at the macro-level, whereas this article specifically 
argues and tests under which conditions policymakers prefer labor market regulation to fiscal 
transfers. Another related and widely cited theoretical paper on why policymakers sometimes 
choose to distribute via distortionary policies is Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), who model the 
choice of redistributive tools as a question of special interest politics rather than partisanship.5 
The next section describes the data used to test the argument that a left-wing government faced 
with high debt levels and an increased levels of market inequality will increase labor market 
regulation. 
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Data and estimation 
This section contains description of the data and estimation method used to test. The dataset 
consists of an unbalanced panel of 33 OECD countries observed in the years 1985, 1990, 1995 
and 2000–12, where data on labor market regulation is available. Countries that are not OECD 
members at the start of the panel enter the dataset when they become OECD members. The next 
subsection describes the data and variables in greater detail. 
 
Measuring labor market regulation 
As labor market regulation is the dependent variable of interest, how to quantitatively measure 
the extent of labor market regulation/deregulation becomes a crucial question. Various 
international organizations, including the OECD, publish quantitative assessments of the level of 
labor market regulation, but the OECD’s regularly updated data focuses primarily on 
employment protection levels. However, labor market regulation is arguably a broader concept 
than merely employment protection. In a study of labor market deregulation and globalization in 
OECD countries, Potrafke (2010) uses an OECD dataset for labor market regulation covering the 
years 1982–2003. However, this OECD data for labor market regulation also includes factors 
such as unemployment benefits’ replacements rates and benefits duration, which are related more 
to fiscal redistribution than to pure regulation. As this article argues that fiscal redistribution and 
labor market regulation are related but separate factors, the measure of labor market regulation 
must exclude public transfers and other types of more direct fiscal redistribution. 
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To capture the broadest potential aspects of labor market regulation while maintaining the focus 
on non-fiscal sources of labor market regulation in line with the theoretical model, I use an index 
of labor market regulation that is a component in the Economic Freedom Index6 published for 
the years 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 and onwards by the Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank. 
The index measuring labor market regulation ranges in values from 0–10, lower values denoting 
higher levels of labor market regulation. I rescale the index in order to make higher values 
denote higher levels of labor market regulation. The labor market regulation score is based on 
country scores on six indicators relating to labor market regulation: 
• Hiring regulation and the existence and stringency of a minimum wage 
• Hiring and firing regulations 
• Centralized collective bargaining 
• Hours regulation 
• Mandated cost of worker’s dismissal  
• The existence and length of conscription  
Data for these indicators come from a variety of sources including the World Bank, World 
Economic Forum and various other sources (Gwartney et al. 2015, 212–214). The labor market 
regulation index from the Economic Freedom Index has been used in other cross-national 
research on the effect of labor market regulation (Feldmann 2009; Freeman 2009: 31). 
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Explanatory variables 
The key explanatory variable is an interaction between three variables: left-wing control of 
government, market inequality and government debt. In line with the theoretical prediction, the 
interaction enables me to observe a potential effect of left-wing partisanship on labor market 
regulation contingent on inequality and government debt level. Left-wing government is 
measured by a dummy taking the value 1 if the leader of the government is from a left-wing 
party based on the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Market inequality is 
measured using the well-known Gini coefficient, and the data is taken from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2009). When measuring market inequality, the Gini 
coefficient for income is calculated before government taxes are subtracted from the income of 
each household and before potential government transfers are added to each household’s income. 
Market inequality thus measures the level of inequality before government redistribution impacts 
the overall income distribution. This is different from the net inequality measure, where the Gini 
coefficient is measured using each household’s final income after government taxes and 
transfers. Using market inequality rather than net inequality enables the measurement of the 
effect of market-based pressure for redistribution in line with the theoretical argument rather than 
observing potential changes in redistribution, which could be an issue with using the net 
inequality measure. Finally, government debt is measured in terms of the gross government debt 
taken from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) World Economic Outlook Database. 
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Control variables 
To control for the potential confounders of government debt, inequality and potentially also 
government ideology, I employ a number of economic controls. The first control is the log of 
GDP per capita to control for level of economic development, which is potentially endogenous to 
labor market regulation (Botero et al. 2004, 1366). The second control variable is growth of 
GDP, which could potentially affect both government debt and inequality and be endogenous to 
labor market regulation. Both GDP per capita and GDP growth are from the World Bank 
Database. The final control is the unemployment rate, which is also potentially endogenous to 
labor market regulation. The relationship between labor regulation and unemployment and 
whether stricter labor market regulation increases structural unemployment remain huge topics in 
the labor and comparative economics literature (Botero et al. 2004; Freeman 2009; Siebert 
1997). Furthermore, for the purpose of this article, it would be reasonable to expect that 
unemployment levels would affect a government’s propensity to increase or decrease labor 
market regulation. While high unemployment could induce a government to introduce labor 
market reforms in order to try to lower structural unemployment, relaxing employment 
protection in the face of high unemployment could be deemed politically unpopular by the 
government. The unemployment rate variable is taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database. 
 
As a final political control, I use the distance between political veto actors to control for the 
potential policy-stability-inducing effect of disagreement between several decision-makers.7 
Several studies have found veto actor dynamics to matter for labor market reforms (Avdagic 
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2013; Becher 2010) and other types of economic deregulation (Smith and Urpelainen 2016). It 
might thus be argued that the composition of government, both regarding the number and 
ideology of potential coalition parties, could labor market regulation levels. I follow Avdagic 
(2013, 440) and use the checks8 variable from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 
2001) as a proxy for the number of and ideological distance between government veto actors. As 
a final control, I add a dummy for whether the country is currently under an IMF program. IMF 
programs frequently come with reform conditions,9 which often concern labor market 
deregulation. Furthermore, the occurrence of an IMF program is probably endogenous to the 
level of government debt.10 Descriptive statistics for all of the variables can be seen in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Estimation 
To estimate the effect of left-wing government control contingency on inequality and 
government debt, I conduct a series of fixed-effect OLS regressions with the labor market 
regulation index as the dependent variable. Fixed effects estimations allow me to analyze 
deviations from the country average and thus within-country variation in labor market regulation. 
They also enable me to hold the historical legacy11 and deeper cultural aspects (Alesina et al. 
2015) of the different countries constant, which might also affect the level of labor market 
regulation. In order to address issues of autocorrelation, standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. The regression equation can be seen in equation 1. 
	
 = (

  ) +  +  +   + ! + "         (1) 
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Regulation is the level of labor market regulation in country i at time t. The first item on the right 
side is the interaction between left-wing partisanship, market inequality and government gross 
debt. C is the constituting items of the three-variable interaction, while V is a vector of controls. 
 is the country-fixed effect, while ! is the year-fixed effect, which are included to control for a 
potential time trend in labor market regulation in the analyzed countries. ε is the error term. 
 
When estimating the above regression, all of the explanatory variables are measured in the same 
year as the dependent variable. However, concerns might be raised about the timing of changes 
in the explanatory variables and their subsequent effect on labor market regulation. In order to 
address this issue in Appendix A,12 the core results are redone lagging all explanatory variables 
one year. However, these results are mostly similar to those of the main analysis. 
 
Results 
The results from the panel analyses can be seen in Table 2. In the first two columns, the potential 
effect of partisanship contingent on either government debt and inequality is investigated but 
without the three-variable interaction. The results from this initial investigation suggest that 
higher government debt is associated with higher levels of labor market regulation in line with 
other findings, which have also suggested a correlation between government debt and regulation 
(Berggren and Bjørnskov 2017). This effect is not magnified by left-wing government 
partisanship as the interaction between debt and left-wing government is actually negative and 
statistically insignificant.  In Column 2, the left-wing government dummy is interacted with 
market inequality and neither this interaction nor its constituting terms seem to have any 
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statistically significant effect on labor market regulation. Left-wing governments do not seem to 
increase labor market regulation significantly more than other types of government when debt 
increases or inequality is higher. However, following the line of argument from the theoretical 
section, we ought to expect neither higher debt nor higher inequality to increase labor market 
regulation under a left-wing government independent of each other. 
 
Turning to the test of the central argument of this article – that left-wing governments facing 
both high debt and higher inequality will increase labor market regulation – in Column 3, the 
index of labor market regulation is regressed on the interaction between left-wing government, 
market inequality and government debt. For the single variables in this interaction, both left-
wing government and government debt have statistically significantly positive coefficients, 
whereas inequality in itself is not statistically significant. The interaction between left-wing 
government and government debt has a negative coefficient. Apparently, when not faced with 
the redistributive pressure from increased market inequality, left-wing governments do not react 
to increased levels of government debt by increasing labor market regulation, which is in line 
with the key theoretical argument that it is the redistributive concerns arising from changes in 
market income inequality which drive left-wing governments’ labor market regulation policies 
under the constraint imposed by high government debt. The interaction between left-wing 
government and inequality and between inequality and government debt are also negative but 
only the latter is statistically significant. The latter coefficient suggests that, under non-left 
governments, increased market inequality actually reduces the effect of government debt on 
labor market regulation. Looking at the key variable of interest, the three-variable interaction 
between left-wing government, government debt and inequality has the expected positive sign 
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with an effect that is statistically significant at p > 0.05. Interpreting the coefficients of these 
different variables together, they seem to provide evidence in favor of the theoretical argument. 
In the case of a coincidence between a left-wing government, higher inequality and a high level 
of government debt, the level of labor market regulation increases. The theoretical argument of 
this article thus seems strengthened by the initial finding. 
 
In order to test the sensitivity of the initial findings in columns 4–8, I add the control variables 
one by one. In Column 4, the log of GDP is added to the specification, which has, in discordance 
with the theoretical expectation, a negative but not statistically significant effect. In the fifth 
column, I add the GDP growth variable, which does not seem to affect labor market regulation 
statistically significantly. Column 6 adds the control for the level of unemployment. 
Unemployment seems to have a non-trivial and statistically significant positive effect on the 
labor regulation index, indicating that an incumbent government would be less inclined to 
deregulate labor markets in the case of high unemployment and might even expand regulation in 
this area. 
 
Veto actor distance is added in the seventh column as an additional political control variable. It 
does not seem to be a statistically significant predictor of labor market regulation. Finally, I add 
the dummy for IMF involvement in Column 8. While this variable has the expected negative 
sign, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The inclusion of these various 
control variables does not fundamentally change the size effect or the statistical significance of 
the interaction between left-wing government, inequality and government debt. The theoretical 
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argument – that dynamics of debt, inequality and government partisanship shape labor market 
regulation – seems further strengthened. In all of the estimations, the sizes of the within-country 
R-squared are relatively high, which suggests that the model explains a large proportion of the 
within-country variation in labor market regulation.13 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The relationship between left-wing government control, inequality and debt is visualized in 
Figure 1, which is based on the estimate in Column 3 of Table 2 and shows the marginal effect of 
market inequality contingent on government type at different levels of government debt. As 
evident from Figure 1a, when government debt is high, which is defined as government debt 
above 60% of GDP,14 increased inequality under left-wing government partisanship causes an 
increase in the level of labor market regulation. Under low levels of government debt (Figure 
1b), there is no statistically significant effect of inequality on labor market regulation under a 
left-wing government and no difference between left-wing and non-left-wing governments.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The effect size is not large but not negligible either. In the case of a government debt level of 60 
% of GDP (about panel average) and a left-wing incumbent government, an increase in market 
inequality from the lowest observation in the panel to the panel mean increases labor market 
regulation with one-third standard deviation. While under lower levels of government debt and 
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under non-left-wing governments, rising market inequality has either no or no positive effect on 
labor market regulation. In line with the theoretical argument, when high debt levels inhibit the 
expansion of fiscal redistribution, left-wing governments use labor market regulation to cushion 
the effect of increased inequality. 
 
Robustness tests 
The above results suggest substantial evidence in favor of the argument that left-wing 
government control, high government debt and increased inequality might jointly increase labor 
market regulation. However, as always with observational studies one should be vary of an 
overconfident causal interpretation of the above results. Especially, left-wing government 
control, government debt and inequality might be endogenous to factors also related to labor 
market regulation but not previously controlled for. Imprecisely measured variables and potential 
outliers might also weaken the validity and generalizability of the results. In order to address 
these issues and to test the robustness of the above finding and the general validity of the 
theoretical argument, in this section I conduct a number of robustness tests concerning both the 
measurement of the key dependent variable, potentially omitted variables and the issues of 
outliers.15 
 
First, I address the issue of the measurement of the dependent variable. Concerns might be raised 
that several of the indicators of the aggregate labor regulation index from the Economic Freedom 
Index are not well suited or targetable as redistributive tools. To address this concern, I redo the 
full analysis from Table 2 in Table 3, Column 1, but replace the full labor regulation index with 
an index, which is the average score of four of the six labor regulation index indicators (hiring 
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regulation and the existence and stringency of a minimum wage, hiring and firing regulation, 
hours regulation and the mandated cost of worker’s dismissal). These are all items that can be 
more directly influenced by an incumbent government and clearly hold distributional properties. 
Replacing the full index with this limited labor market regulation index yields the same results as 
the main analysis, which provides evidence in favor of the main theoretical argument about how 
an incumbent left-wing government might use labor regulation as a distributive tool under high 
debt and inequality. 
 
I then turn to address the issues of potentially omitted variables from the main analysis. First, 
since previous research suggests that the influence of trade unions might significantly affect the 
nature and propensity of labor market reforms,16 I control for the potential organizational power 
of national unions by including a measure of union density from the Comparative Political 
Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2015) as an additional control. However, the introduction of this 
variable in Column 2 of Table 3 does not change the size effect and statistical significance of the 
key interaction between left-wing government control, inequality and government debt. 
Furthermore, the union density variable itself is statistically insignificant. 
 
I then address the issue of government revenue. As noted in the theoretical section, even if a left-
wing government is able to raise further public revenue (e.g. through increased taxation), in 
times of high debt the government will put this extra revenue toward consolidating public 
finances. When also faced with increased inequality, a left-wing government will use labor 
market regulation as an alternative redistributive tool rather than putting the extra tax revenue 
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toward additional public transfers. However, this argument has only rested on an assumption 
thus far. So in order to hold the aspect of public revenue constant in Column 3 of Table 3, I add a 
control of public revenue as a percentage of GDP from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
Database. However, adding this control does not change the size effect or statistical significance 
level of the key interaction variable in any significant way. 
 
I then address the issue of the post-financial crisis years. As noted in the introduction, the labor 
market reform issue became particularly salient in many European countries in the aftermath of 
economic and fiscal crisis following the global financial crisis of 2008, and the experiences of 
many countries during this period might be driving many of the previous results. In order to 
account for this in Column 4 of Table 3, I add a dummy that takes the value 1 in the years after 
2008. While this dummy seems to have a substantial and statistically very significantly negative 
effect on labor market regulation, it does not seem to change the core results. 
 
Additionally, I address the issue of potential outliers. There is massive variation among the 
countries included in the study with regards to their levels of government debt and especially 
changes in this variable over the analyzed period. One concern might be that extreme values on 
the debt variable are driving the above results. In order to address this issue in Column 5 of 
Table 3, I exclude all observations with debt to GDP above 120, which is approximately two 
standard deviations over the panel mean. However, this sample restriction does not change the 
size or statistical significance of the key three-variable interaction between left-wing 
government, inequality and government debt. Finally, to alleviate concerns that the results could 
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be driven by very country-specific experiences, I redo the main estimation removing one country 
at the time from the analysis. Even with these sample restrictions, the main results stay robust.17  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
The above results would appear to provide robust evidence in favor of the article’s theoretical 
argument. However, an additional concern might be raised that the relevant factor for the debt-
contingent effect of government partisanship on labor market regulation might not be inequality 
but rather unemployment, as earlier evidence from the partisan politics literature suggests that 
left-wing governments respond with looser fiscal policy under higher levels of unemployment 
than other types of government (Cusack 1999). Taking this perspective, high government debt 
might also inhibit further fiscal stimulus and make higher levels of labor market regulation 
attractive for an incumbent left-wing government. Thus, the market inequality effect might 
merely be a proxy for the effect of high unemployment levels. To explore whether this might be 
the case, in table 4 I conduct a proxy test adding to the estimate in Table 2, Column 8 an 
interaction between unemployment, government debt and left-wing government to test whether 
the apparent debt and partisan contingent effect of inequality is just reflecting a debt and partisan 
contingent effect of unemployment on labor market regulation. 
 
The results do not suggest any statistically significant effect of the interaction between left-wing 
partisanship, high government debt and high unemployment, since this three-variable interaction 
is not statistically significant despite having the expected positive sign. The three-variable 
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interaction between left-wing government, government debt and market inequality retains its size 
effect and statistical significance level from Table 2. The results lend further support to the 
theoretical model and the argument that the joint effect of left-wing government, government 
debt and market inequality can explain changes in national labor market regulation. 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Discussion  
The extent of labor market regulation continues to be a top policy question in many countries but 
the causes of variance in labor market regulation both within and between countries remain open 
to inquiry. This article has argued that some of the variation in labor market regulation can be 
explained by the role of left-wing parties in labor market regulation. Labor market regulation can 
reduce economic efficiency but also serves as a redistributive tool. Thus, when left-wing 
governments are faced with increased demand for redistribution due to higher market inequality 
but simultaneously faced with budget constraints due to high levels of government indebtedness, 
they will use increased labor regulation as redistribution. 
 
Panel data for 33 OECD countries shows strong support for the theoretical argument. Labor 
market regulation is unaffected by market inequality when government debt is low but left-wing 
governments seem to increase labor market regulation under rising inequality if government debt 
is high. 
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The findings in this article provide a potential explanation for often-lagging labor market reforms 
in times of high government indebtedness, which often follows financial and other economic 
crises18 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). Given that fiscal consolidations carried out in the context of 
less regulated labor markets could be less economically costly (Alesina and Ardagna 2013, 9), 
the results of this article suggest that countries facing high government debt levels, extensive 
labor market regulation and increases in income inequality could be caught in a vicious reform 
sclerosis equilibrium under left-wing governments; a situation where the left-wing government is 
being forced to embark on fiscal austerity due to high indebtedness but unable to introduce 
economic reforms, which might cushion the effect of austerity policies since labor market 
policies the only way a left-wing government can redistribute to its core constituency.19 
 
The article also contributes to the broader discussion regarding the relationship between partisan 
politics and inequality (Boix 2010: 493) and is of relevance for the discussion of the effect of 
inequality on economic growth (Banerjee and Duflo 2003). It especially provides a micro-
founded explanation for the results from studies that have found an effect of inequality on 
economic performance contingent on government partisanship (Bjørnskov 2008). 
 
The area of labor market regulation seems to be one  policy area where different combinations of 
partisan orientation and economic factors can produce various different policy outcomes. Future 
research could explore the extent to which this also goes for other areas of government public 
policies. The article’s main theoretical argument that tinkering with regulation levels becomes an 
attractive area for partisan politics when the government faces budget constraints might thus 
25 
 
have wider implications. For an example, we might expect right-wing governments to use 
deregulation within certain policy areas (e.g. environmental protection and labor standards to 
redistribute to their core constituency), such as private businesses and entrepreneurs, when the 
state of government finances makes tax cuts and tax deductions to these interests less possible.20 
Future research might thus investigate how partisanship and conditional economic and 
institutional factors impact the nature of public regulation between and within countries beyond 
labor market policies. 
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Tables and figures  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations 
Labor market regulation 3.92 1.56 0.72 7.19 433 
Left-wing government 0.37 0.48 0 1 433 
Market inequality (Gini) 46.44 4.24 32.44 56.6 433 
Government debt 57.84 34.36 6.07 216 433 
Log of GDP per capita 10.21 0.60 8.64 11.36 433 
GDP growth  2.29 2.90 -9 11 433 
Unemployment  7.43 4 2 24.8 433 
Veto actor distance 4.15 1.15 2 9 433 
Under IMF program 0.07 0.26 0 1 433 
 
  
33 
 
Table 2. Results  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Left-wing government  0.2069 (0.1346) 
-0.8706 
(0.9130) 
3.3600 
(1.9480)* 
3.3613 
(1.9565)* 
3.2666 
(1.9921) 
3.4446 
(2.0357)* 
3.3761 
(2.0482) 
3.4188 
(2.0154)* 
Market inequality 0.0062 (0.0222) 
-0.0061 
(0.0230) 
0.0604 
(0.0430) 
0.0639 
(0.0411) 
0.0625 
(0.0412) 
0.0588 
(0.0413) 
0.0572 
(0.0416) 
0.0508 
(0.0400) 
Government debt 0.0070 (0.0029)** 
0.0071 
(0.0027)** 
0.0577 
(0.0250)** 
0.0543 
(0.0233)** 
0.0537 
(0.0234)** 
0.0546 
(0.0235)** 
0.0538 
(0.0238)** 
0.0501 
(0.0219)** 
Left-wing government × 
government debt 
-0.0014 
(0.0021) - 
-0.0783 
(0.0306)** 
-0.0789 
(0.0298)** 
-0.0776 
(0.0305)** 
-0.0710 
(0.0296)** 
-0.070 
(0.0298)** 
-0.0705 
(0.0284)** 
Left-wing government × 
market inequality - 
0.0213 
(0.0189) 
-0.0661 
(0.0407) 
-0.0661 
(0.0404) 
-0.0638 
(0.0413) 
-0.0672 
(0.0429) 
-0.0657 
(0.0431) 
-0.0670 
(0.0424) 
Market inequality × 
government debt - - 
-0.0011 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0010 
(0.0005)* 
-0.0010 
(0.0005)* 
-0.0010 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0010 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0009 
(0.0005)* 
Left-wing government × 
market inequality × 
government debt 
- - 
0.0016 
(0.0006)** 
0.0016 
(0.0006)** 
0.0016 
(0.0006)** 
0.0014 
(0.0006)** 
0.0014 
(0.0006)** 
0.0014 
(0.0006)** 
Log of GDP per capita - - - 0.9889 (1.0577) 
1.0155 
(1.0286) 
1.7954 
(0.9677)* 
1.7709 
(0.9624)* 
1.9138 
(0.9748)* 
GDP growth - - - - -0.0093 (0.0181) 
0.0017 
(0.0168) 
0.0009 
(0.0165) 
-0.0026 
(0.0175) 
Unemployment - -- - - - 0.0637 (0.0232)*** 
0.0633 
(0.0227)*** 
0.0642 
(0.0225)*** 
Veto actor distance - - - - - - -0.0310 (0.0509) 
-0.0292 
(0.0505) 
Under IMF program - - - - - - - -0.2557 (0.1810) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
Number of observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Within R-squared 0.7086 0.7099 0.7202 0.7244 0.7248 0.7398 0.7404 0.7439 
Notes: Dependent variable is labor market regulation. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
*: significance level 0.10, **: significance level 0.05, ***: significance level 0.01 
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Figure 1 Effect of inequality on labor market regulation contingent on partisanship and government debt 
a: High debt level  b. Low debt level  
  
Note: High debt level is defined as general government debt exceeding 60% of GDP. Vertical lines show 90% confidence intervals.  
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Table 3: Robustness tests 
  
Limited labor 
market regulation 
index 
Control for 
union density 
Control for 
public revenue 
Control of post 
crisis years 
Excluding 
observations with 
debt > 120% of GDP 
Left-wing government  5.0598 (2.7942)* 
3.4846 
(1.6905)** 
3.2727 
(2.0035) 
3.4188 
(2.0154)* 
3.4337 
(2.1917) 
Market inequality 0.0310 (0.0436) 
0.0442 
(0.0452) 
0.0566 
(0.0427) 
0.0508 
(0.0400) 
0.0480 
(0.0437) 
Government debt 0.0298 (0.0224) 
0.0462 
(0.0269)* 
0.0524 
(0.0230)** 
0.0501 
(0.0219)** 
0.0535 
(0.0260)** 
Left-wing government × government 
debt 
-0.0935 
(0.0352)** 
-0.0697 
(0.0252)*** 
-0.0644 
(0.0279)** 
-0.0705 
(0.0284)** 
-0.0709 
(0.0324)** 
Left-wing government × market 
inequality 
-0.1030 
(0.0589)* 
-0.0716 
(0.0359)* 
-0.0642 
(0.0423) 
-0.0670 
(0.0424) 
-0.0677 
(0.0466) 
Market inequality × government debt -0.0006 (0.0005) 
-0.0008 
(0.0006) 
-0.0010 
(0.0005)* 
-0.0009 
(0.0005)* 
-0.0010 
(0.0006)* 
Left-wing government × market 
inequality × government debt 
0.0019 
(0.0007)** 
0.0015 
(0.0005)*** 
0.0013 
(0.0006)** 
0.0014 
(0.0006)** 
0.0015 
(0.0007)** 
Log of GDP per capita 3.1497 (0.9193)*** 
2.0924 
(0.9962)** 
1.7572 
(1.0404) 
1.9138 
(0.9748)* 
1.6806 
(0.9671)* 
GDP growth 0.0071 (0.0112) 
-0.0367 
(0.0153)** 
-0.0135 
(0.0143) 
-0.0026 
(0.0175) 
-0.0019 
(0.0177) 
Unemployment 0.0433 (0.0314) 
0.0543 
(0.0242)** 
0.0568 
(0.0230)** 
0.0642 
(0.0225)*** 
0.0699 
(0.0240)*** 
Veto actor distance 0.0031 (0.0420) 
0.0342 
(0.0511) 
-0.0079 
(0.0487) 
-0.0292 
(0.0505) 
-0.0274 
(0.0527) 
Under IMF program 0.1358 (0.1896) 
-0.4675 
(0.1337)*** 
-0.2419 
(0.1858) 
-0.2557 
(0.1810) 
-0.2298 
(0.1946) 
Union density - 0.0075 (0.0121) - - - 
Public revenue as percent of GDP - - -0.0006 (0.01948) - - 
Post 2008-crisis dummy - - - -3.3806 (0.9221)*** - 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 33 28 33 33 33 
Number of observations 318 345 432 433 414 
Within R-squared 0.2855 0.7855 0.7492 0.7439 0.7387 
Notes: Dependent variable is labor market regulation except in Column 1. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
*: significance level 0.10, **: significance level 0.05, ***: significance level 0.01 
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Table 4: Proxy test: Unemployment  
  (1) 
Left-wing government  3.6607 (2.108)* 
Market inequality 0.0388 (0.0455) 
Government debt 0.0432 (0.0250)* 
Left-wing government × market inequality   -0.0694 (0.0449) 
Market inequality × government debt  -0.0007 (0.0006) 
Left-wing government × government debt  -0.0749 (0.0306)** 
Left-wing government × market inequality × government debt  0.0015 (0.0007)** 
Left-wing government × unemployment -0.0218 (0.0371) 
Unemployment × government debt  -0.0005 (0.0006) 
Left-wing government × government debt × unemployment 0.0002 (0.0006) 
Log of GDP per capita 2.0128 (0.9463)** 
GDP growth  -0.0047 (0.0181) 
Unemployment 0.1025 (0.0432)** 
Veto actor distance -0.0233 (0.0518) 
Under IMF program -0.2335 (0.1952) 
Country-fixed effects Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes 
Number of countries  33 
Number of observations 433 
Within R-squared 0.7455 
Notes: Dependent variable is labor market regulation. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
*: significance level 0.10, **: significance level 0.05, ***: significance level 0.01 
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Appendix A: Core results with lagged explanatory variables 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Left-wing government  0.3346 (0.1570)** 
-0.6078 
(0.9013) 
4.4033 
(2.0823)** 
4.4142 
(2.1122)** 
4.1868 
(2.2151)* 
4.3441 
(2.2727)* 
4.3402 
(2.2828)* 
4.3061 
(2.2828)* 
Market inequality -0.0050 (0.0191) 
-0.0151 
(0.0202) 
0.0773 
(0.0417)* 
0.0785 
(0.0407)* 
0.0752 
(0.0399)* 
0.0728 
(0.0415)* 
0.0728 
(0.0415)* 
0.0627 
(0.0403) 
Government debt 0.0071 (0.0031)** 
0.0069 
(0.0028)** 
0.0774 
(0.0266)*** 
0.0754 
(0.0256)*** 
0.0741 
(0.0253)*** 
0.0750 
(0.02650)*** 
0.0749 
(0.0265)*** 
0.0698 
(0.0236)*** 
Left-wing government 
× government debt 
-0.0019 
(0.0024) - 
-0.0925 
(0.0305)*** 
-0.0933 
(0.0307)*** 
-0.0900 
(0.0318)*** 
-0.0878 
(0.0319)*** 
-0.0877 
(0.0322)*** 
-0.0872 
(0.0311)*** 
Left-wing government 
× market inequality - 
0.0178 
(0.0194) 
-0.0852 
(0.0453)* 
-0.0853 
(0.0455)* 
-0.0803 
(0.0477) 
-0.0832 
(0.0492)* 
-0.0832 
(0.0493) 
-0.0828 
(0.0493) 
Market inequality × 
government debt - - 
-0.0015 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0014 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0014 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0015 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.0015 
(0.0006)** 
-0.0013 
(0.0005)** 
Left-wing government 
× market inequality × 
government debt 
- - 
0.0019 
(0.0006)*** 
0.0019 
(0.0006)*** 
0.0018 
(0.0007)*** 
0.0018 
(0.0007)*** 
0.0018 
(0.0007)** 
0.0018 
(0.0007)** 
Log of GDP per capita - - - 0.6160 (0.9790) 
0.6593 
(0.9518) 
1.2272 
(0.9529) 
1.2258 
(0.9546) 
1.4105 
(0.9636) 
GDP growth - - - - -0.0099 (0.0166) 
-0.0033 
(0.0167) 
-0.0035 
(0.0173) 
-0.0076 
(0.0169) 
Unemployment - - - - - 0.0424 (0.0244)* 
0.0423 
(0.0245)* 
0.0439 
(0.0253)* 
Veto actor distance - - - - - - -0.0051 (0.0356) 
-0.0005 
(0.0348) 
Under IMF program - - - - - - - -0.3218 (0.1650)* 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries  450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
Number of 
observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Within R-squared  0.7054 0.7057 0.7224 0.724 0.7245 0.7311 0.7311 0.7372 
Notes: Dependent variable is labor market regulation. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
*: significance level 0.10, **: significance level 0.05, ***: significance level 0.01 
 
                                                          
1
 Although measures of labor market regulation are pooled with other measures of regulation. 
2
 See Hübscher (2016) for a recent piece supporting this view. 
3
 For a brief review, see Becher (2010: 34). 
4
 See Lindvall and Rueda (2014) for such a study. 
5
 In their model, the key purpose of the policy intervention is to keep the size of a given political pressure group 
stable through subsidization/regulation in order for the group to keep its political influence.    
6
 For more information about the Economic Freedom Index in general, see Hall and Lawson (2014).  
7
 For a comprehensive veto actor framework, see the classical work of Tsebelis (2002). 
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8
 The variable measures both the number and ideological differences between parties within the ruling government 
coalition. 
9
 For a recent article on the role of the IMF in economic reforms, which also concerns partisanship, see Beazer and 
Woo (2015). 
10
 The experiences of Ireland, Portugal and Greece during the European sovereign debt crisis are notable examples 
of this relationship. 
11
 Which some scholars might argue is an important factor in labor market regulation, especially if viewing the 
politics of labor market regulation through the lenses of the varieties of capitalism approach to the study of 
developed democracies (Thelen 2012). 
12
 Due to data availability in the dataset, the year 1985 is removed from the analysis while the year 2013 is added. 
The total number of observations also increases by a small margin. 
13
 This rather large R-squared is likely driven by the year and country-fixed effects, since an empty model with these 
explanatory variables alone yields an R-squared of about 0.66. 
14
 Which is just above the panel mean for this variable. 
15
 Due to data availability, the number of observations and number of countries analyzed decreases in some of these 
estimations. 
16
 See, among others, Davidson and Emmenegger (2013). 
17
 Results are available upon request. The removal of Ireland reduces the three-variable interaction between left-
wing government, inequality and government debt somewhat and increases the p-value of this interaction to 0.109, 
just below conventional levels of statistical significance. However, when using  the limited labor market regulation 
index as the dependent variable the three-variable  interaction is still significant at the p<0.05-level,  even when 
Ireland is removed. These results suggest that the theoretical argument is valid beyond Ireland.  
18
 Recent research by Young and Bologna (2016) also report an association between government debt crisis and 
increased levels of general regulation. 
19
 Given that some recent research has suggested that left-wing parties often fare relatively poorly electorally during 
economic crises (Kayser and Grafström 2015), however, the equilibrium might not be prevalent. 
20
 I thank the article’s reviewers for bringing this implication of the main theoretical argument to my attention. 
